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LIMBO AND THE CHILDREN OF FAERIE
Andrew Pinsent
The fate of the ungraced innocents highlights much of what has been most 
difficult about the doctrine of original sin. As an alternative to the extremes 
of an easy-going universalism or consignment to the fires of hell, this paper  
re-examines Aquinas’s claims about a possible state of ungraced natural 
flourishing, arguing that this state is richer and more interesting than the 
name “limbo” implies. The paper also applies recent work in philosophy 
and psychology, especially on the second-person perspective, to understand 
better the state of those in limbo, who might more appropriately be called 
the “children of faerie.” It concludes by examining the possible relationship 
of the children of faerie and the children of God in a post-resurrection state.
1. “Their Sense Is Hard to Me”
Consider the following influential speculation about the fate of those who 
die with no sin except original sin:
For there be some that are withdrawn from the present light, before they 
attain to show forth the good or evil deserts of an active life. And whereas 
the sacraments of salvation do not free them from the sin of their birth, 
at the same time that here they never did aright by their own act, there 
they are brought to torment. And these have one wound, namely to be 
born in corruption, and another, to die in the flesh. But forasmuch as after 
death there also follows death eternal, by a secret and righteous judgment 
“wounds are multiplied to them without cause.” For they even receive 
ever lasting torments who never sinned by their own will.1
The notion of everlasting torments, described here as without cause, has 
long seemed the most repugnant claim in some of the patristic writings on 
original sin. One reading of Dante’s response to the words over the gate 
1The translation here is a slightly modified version of Pope Gregory I, Morals on the Book 
of Job, 9.32. The original text can be found in Pope Gregory I, S. Gregorii Magni Moralia in Iob, 
479. “Nonnulli etiam prius a praesenti luce subtrahuntur quam ad proferenda bona malaue 
merita actiuae uitae perueniant. Quos quia a culpa originis salutis sacramenta non liberant, 
et hic ex proprio nil egerunt, et illuc ad tormenta perueniunt. Quibus unum uulnus est 
corruptibiliter nasci, aliud carnaliter emori. Sed quia post mortem quoque aeterna mors se-
quitur, occulto eis iustoque iudicio etiam sine causa uulnera multiplicantur. Perpetua quippe 
tormenta percipiunt et qui nihil ex propria uoluntate peccauerunt.”
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of hell, “Their sense is hard to me (il senso lor m’è duro),”2 is that it is hard 
to reconcile the justice and love of God with the doctrine of damnation, 
even for those who have in some sense chosen to be lost. What about the 
fate (and the implications of the fate) of those dead who never received the 
grace of baptism and had no opportunity to make choices for good or evil? 
Are these unfortunates also lost forever? Do they suffer the pain of this 
loss? Do these exemplars of “pure nature” suffer actual punishment even 
if, as Augustine conceded, their pain is of the mildest kind?3
Such questions are scarcely the only ones regarding original sin, but 
they highlight much of what has been most difficult about the doctrine 
in its undiluted form, given that they concern the state and fate of human 
beings suffering from original sin alone. Even for a single soul without 
any choice in the matter, the notion of everlasting torments seems un-
answerably horrific. The challenge is rendered even more severe (if that 
is possible) by considering the sheer numbers of people who could con-
ceivably face such a fate. By far the majority of persons who have never 
chosen to sin die without baptism, especially if one includes the uncount-
able multitude of men and women who are conceived but never born. In 
such cases, how is it possible to reconcile God’s salvific will for all human 
beings4 with the need for baptism, or at least the grace of baptism,5 in 
order to be freed from original sin and be saved?6 It is no wonder that 
such questions have attracted theological, philosophical and broader 
public interest to the present day.
In the absence of explicit teaching from the sources of revelation, 
commentators throughout the centuries have offered an unusually wide 
spectrum of answers. Extrapolating from their assessment of the depravity 
of the world, and mindful of challenges to Christian teaching about bap-
tism (notably the Pelagian heresy), many patristic writers offered the kind 
of tough-minded response illustrated in the opening citation, variants 
of which can be found to the present day.7 By this interpretation, dead 
2The words of Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto III, v.12., “il senso lor m’è duro,” have sev-
eral possible and overlapping meanings, not all of which survive translation well. Dante 
the traveller may be expressing his difficulty in understanding or accepting the words over 
the gate of hell, or simply expressing his fear. The words may also echo the Vulgate version 
of John 6:60, “durus est hic sermo” which is translated in the Revised Standard Version as 
“This is a hard saying.” For an overview of the issues, see the commentary on Canto III in 
Dante Alighieri, The Inferno. For a convenient compilation of other commentaries, see also 
the Dante Lab, http://dantelab.dartmouth.edu.
3Augustine, Enchiridion ad Laurentium 93. 
4Cf. 1 Timothy 2:4.
5The theology and terminology of grace is quite complex, but in this paper “grace” should 
be taken to mean “the grace of baptism,” also called “sanctifying grace.” For a description, 
see, for example, Catechism of the Catholic Church, paras. 1262–1274.
6Cf. Mark 16:16; Matthew 28:18–19.
7John Mullen, for example, makes use of Molinist reasoning to argue that human beings 
inherit genetic conceptions that make sin inevitable, and for which they are morally respon-
sible. See Mullen, “Can Evolutionary Psychology Confirm Original Sin?,” 273. 
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ungraced innocents join the unrepentant sinners in hell, even if in a rela-
tively mild form of hell.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, others have drawn inspiration 
from instances of grace being received by extraordinary means, such as 
those recognised as “Holy Innocents” who were murdered by Herod 
in his desire to kill Christ.8 By extending these extraordinary means to 
all other innocents who have no chance of baptism, or by some appeal 
to universal salvation, it can then be argued that the ultimate fate of the 
unbaptised infants does not differ essentially from that of the baptised 
innocents, namely that they will all enjoy the vision of God in heaven.9
Finally, there is a long tradition regarding a possible state called “limbo” 
that is not in heaven and which, being permanent, is technically part of 
hell, or at least the border or edge (limbus) of hell. Despite its infernal as-
sociations, however, limbo is not a place of punishment and may even be a 
kind of paradise, as in the case of Dante’s portrayal of limbo as the Elysian 
Fields of antiquity.10
Lacking any straightforward way to narrow down the options for how 
permanently ungraced innocents (if they exist) will spend eternity, it is 
not uncommon to express agnosticism regarding their fate or to deny the 
problem altogether, as in the case of those who deny original sin.11 Ag-
nosticism, however, cannot be regarded as a wholly satisfying response, 
especially as the fate of the ungraced innocents is interwoven with so 
many other theological issues. Moreover, the denial of original sin is 
scarcely without its own problems. Even if one sets aside all the claims 
of theology, the fact remains that human beings show a depressingly con-
sistent bent towards evil when constraints on behaviour are removed, as 
shown in cases of social breakdown and in the virtual worlds of recent 
human invention.12 The denial of the doctrine of original sin does not do 
away with the need to assign some name to the root of these tendencies, 
or the desire to speculate about the destiny of those who die with this 
root intact, even if they lack any of the dark fruits of sin and vice that it 
customarily engenders.
Within the theological framework of the existence of original sin and 
need for the grace of baptism, is it possible to shed further light on these 
matters? In this paper, I re-examine the approach taken by Thomas Aquinas 
8Matthew 2:16–18.
9For a recent review of various approaches, see, for example, Sharkey and Weinandy, eds., 
“The Hope of Salvation for Infants Who Die Without Being Baptised”; note also the Catechism 
of the Catholic Church, para. 1283, “With respect to children who have died without Baptism, 
the liturgy of the Church invites us to trust in God’s mercy and to pray for their salvation.”
10Dante portrays limbo as the Elysian Fields in Inferno, Canto IV.
11A text often cited as an influential early denial of original sin is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Emile, 111: “il n’y a point de perversité originelle dans le cœur humain [there is no original 
perversity in the human heart].” As shall be seen, however, there is also a sense in which 
Aquinas likewise claims that there is no original defect of human nature qua nature.
12See, for example, Bartlett, The Dark Net.
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to the fate of the ungraced innocents, especially the detailed analysis 
in his work on evil (Quaestiones disputatae de malo; hereafter, QDM), QQ. 
4 and 5. The account of Aquinas represents a high water mark, over a 
span of more than a millennium, in terms of a positive assessment of the 
fate of the ungraced innocents, while still maintaining a certain distinc-
tion between their fate and that of the saints.13 Aquinas’s reputation and 
his approach to this problem therefore suggest that his insights are worth 
revisiting, especially in the light of new developments in psychology and 
the philosophy of religion.
2. Aquinas and Limbo
Aquinas’s principal claims about original sin and its punishment are most 
easily summarised by listing the conclusions to his arguments. In QDM 
Q. 4, on original sin generally, these conclusions are: (A. 1) it is not impos-
sible for sin to be contracted by way of origin (and so the possibility of 
original sin is not ruled out a priori); (A. 2) that original sin is not simply 
concupiscence, or ignorance, or the absence of “original justice,” or a 
penalty or fault, although it has aspects of all of these defects; (A. 3) that 
original sin is in the soul as its subject; (A. 4) that original sin is first in the 
essence of the soul, not the powers of the soul; (A. 5) that it is first in the 
will, rather than the other powers; (A. 6) that it is transmitted from Adam to 
all who seminally derive from him; (A. 7) that if any originate from Adam 
only by way of matter, they would not contract original sin; and (A. 8) 
that the sins of near-ancestors are not transmitted to their posterity by way 
of origin. In QDM Q. 5, which examines the punishment of original sin, 
Aquinas adds that: (A. 1) deprival of the vision of God is a fitting punish-
ment for original sin; (A. 2) that the punishment of sense is not incurred 
for original sin; (A. 3) that those who die only with original sin do not 
suffer interior pain; (A. 4) that death and other punishments in this life are 
a punishment for original sin; and (A. 5) that death and other such defects 
are not natural to man.
Even a cursory glance at these conclusions reveals some striking 
(though diplomatically worded) divergences from the received sense of 
much of the patristic tradition, most notably the way in which Aquinas 
broadens and softens the statements of Gregory and Augustine to the 
point that he does not attribute any pain of sense or of loss to the eter-
nity of the ungraced innocents (Q. 5, A. 2). A close reading of the texts 
reveals that the contrasting approach of Aquinas rests on two distinctions 
that were still imprecise in the patristic period. First, Aquinas emphasises 
the difference between a fault of nature (vitium naturae) and the fault of 
a person (vitium personae), with original sin placed in the former rather 
13Contrary to common prejudice, attitudes to the fate of the virtuous pagans and un-
graced innocents did not progress smoothly from medieval severity to modern toleration, 
but achieved a high-water mark in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Many Christians in 
the seventeenth century took a hardline view (sometimes even more than Augustine) about 
pagan wickedness. See Marenbon, Pagans and Philosophers, 304.
297LIMBO AND THE CHILDREN OF FAERIE
than the latter category.14 On the basis of this distinction, Aquinas claims 
that human beings contract original sin by physical descent but without 
personal fault, illustrating this claim by comparing the unity of the human 
race to the union of the parts of a body in a single action. For example, the 
motion of a hand that commits homicide can impress a certain effect on 
the hand, insofar as a hand can only be considered to be living as such as 
part of a living human being, but the hand cannot itself be regarded as 
personally culpable.15 Aquinas argues that original sin similarly impresses 
an effect on human nature. When any rational soul created by God par-
ticipates in this nature by descent, the effect is like a ray of the sun passing 
into a contaminated region and being darkened.16
Nevertheless, as in the case of the hand considered in itself, there is no 
personal sin attributed to individuals who contract this fault, a distinction 
with consequences for eternity, since,
Punishment is proportioned to fault; and therefore to actual mortal sin, in 
which there is a turning away from an unchangeable good and a turning to-
wards a transitory good . . . (but) in original sin there is not a turning-to, but 
only a turning-away, or something corresponding to turning-away, namely 
the soul’s abandonment of original justice; and therefore the punishment 
of sense is not attributed to original sin but only the punishment of loss, 
namely deprival of the vision of God.17
Aquinas claims in this passage that even though original sin deprives 
a person of the vision of God, the punishment of sense is not imputed 
except on account of actual sin. Hence Aquinas argues that ungraced in-
nocents do not suffer any pain of sense in eternity.
A second important distinction that was not so clearly defined by pa-
tristic writers is grounded on an appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy 
that only became possible long after the patristic era. This distinction is 
between what is natural or pertains to human nature (naturalis) and a life 
of grace that is above or beyond human nature (supernaturalis). Aquinas 
outlines the basic thesis of this distinction in the Summa theologiae (ST), 
most clearly in his account of the theological virtues.
14QDM Q. 5, A. 2: “Ut autem ex praemissis patet, peccatum originale est vitium naturae, 
peccatum autem actuale est vitium personae.”
15QDM Q. 4, A. 1: “Therefore just as homicide is not said to be the fault of the hand but 
of the whole man, so this defect [i.e., original sin] is not said to be a personal sin but a sin 
of the whole nature, nor does it pertain to the person except inasmuch as the nature infects 
the person (Sicut ergo homicidium non dicitur culpa manus, sed culpa totius hominis; ita 
huiusmodi defectus non dicitur esse peccatum personale, sed peccatum totius naturae; nec 
ad personam pertinet, nisi in quantum natura inficit personam).” The translations of QDM 
are from the version cited in the References; I have chosen to use slightly different terms in 
a few places.
16QDM Q. 4, A. 3, ad 3.
17QDM Q. 5, A. 2: “poena proportionatur culpae et ideo peccato actuali mortali, in quo 
invenitur aversio ab incommutabili bono et conversio ad bonum commutabile debetur . . . 
Sed in peccato originali non est conversio, sed sola aversio, vel aliquid aversioni respondens, 
scilicet destitutio animae a iustitia originali: et ideo peccato originali non debetur poena 
sensus, sed solum poena damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinae.”
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Human happiness, however, is twofold. . . . One is proportionate to human 
nature, a happiness that man can obtain by means of his natural principles. 
The other is a happiness surpassing human nature, and which man can obtain 
by divine power (virtue) alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, 
about which it is written (2 Peter 1:4) that by Christ we are made “partakers 
of the divine nature.”18
According to Aquinas, the notion of partaking in the divine nature that is 
cited here involves a transformation of human nature into the life of grace, 
a life that has its own special infused virtues and gifts. Only with this 
transformation can human beings live in the hope of seeing God.
What then does it mean for someone to live a natural life without grace? 
In QDM, Aquinas draws attention to the natural human incapacity to 
attain the supernatural end of grace:
Hence the Apostle says in the First Epistle to the Corinthians 2:9 that, “Eye 
has not seen nor ear heard neither has it entered into the human heart, what 
things God has prepared for those who love him,” and afterwards [in verse 
ten], he adds “But to us God has revealed them through his Spirit,” which 
revelation pertains to faith.19
In this passage, the references to the unseeing eye and the unhearing ear 
emphasise that the flourishing of the saints is beyond natural knowledge, 
and the reference to the things prepared by God not entering the human 
heart suggests also that this flourishing is beyond natural desire.
On this basis, Aquinas argues that,
the souls of children [without the grace of baptism] do not know that they 
are deprived of such a good, and do not grieve on account of this; but this 
knowledge which they have by nature, they possess without grief.20
The exemption from the sense of loss described in this text is not because 
these children are sunk into a darkness of ignorance generally. Aquinas 
rejects this possibility by adding that “it is not reasonable that these souls 
would suffer any loss in natural goods,”21 which includes the knowledge 
proper to a separated soul. Instead, the reason for this exemption is that 
such children do not know or desire God in the way that is possible in the 
18ST 1a, Q. 62, A. 1: “Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas . . . Una quidem 
proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae 
naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina 
virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod 
dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae.” In this chapter, 
the translations of the ST are based on the version given in the references; I have modified 
the translation in minor ways in a few places.
19QDM Q. 5, A. 3: “Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. II, 9, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris 
audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se: et postea subdit: 
nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum suum: quae quidem revelatio ad fidem pertinet.”
20QDM, Q. 5, A. 3: “Et ideo se privari tali bono, animae puerorum non cognoscunt, et 
propter hoc non dolent; sed hoc quod per naturam habent, absque dolore possident.”
21QDM, Q. 5, A. 3: “quia cum in pueris non sit peccatum actuale quod est proprie pec-
catum personale non debetur eis ut detrimentum aliquod patiantur in naturalibus bonis.”
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life of grace. Postponing consideration of what, precisely, is meant by this 
life of grace, Aquinas’s main point is clear: those who die in this state of 
pure nature, without grace and without actual sin, have no pain of sense 
and no pain of loss.
Instead of burning in the flames of hell, the ultimate fate of the ungraced 
innocents in Aquinas’s account diverges radically, therefore, from the re-
ceived sense of influential speculations of the patristic tradition. These 
souls enjoy all the good things that they desire naturally, do not suffer, 
do not die, and have natural knowledge, presumably including natural 
knowledge of God.22 According to other texts in Aquinas’s work, these 
innocents can also look forward to a final resurrection at the perfect age of 
about thirty years old.23 This fate does not seem too dreadful, drawing the 
sting of what seems most objectionable about the tough-minded claims 
of the patristic age. Moreover, unlike the sighing souls in the shadows of 
Dante’s well-appointed limbo, or those whose gaze towards God is blocked 
by an impenetrable ceiling of rock in Enguerrand Quarton’s depiction of 
eternity, these ungraced innocents do not have any natural desire for the 
supernatural or other unrequited desires.24 From the perspective of those 
with grace, this state is deficient in some sense, but does not seem deficient 
to those who are in it. On the contrary, one can be in Aquinas’s limbo, it 
seems, and call it paradise, without any sense of loss or deprivation.
Prior to examining the possibilities of this state in more detail, it is worth 
anticipating an objection.25 Since at least the work of Henri de Lubac, it 
has sometimes been thought that Aquinas denies the possibility of natural 
completion without grace, on the grounds that all human beings have a 
natural desire for the supernatural end of knowing and loving God.26 I do 
not intend to address this issue here beyond stating the following. What-
ever Aquinas writes elsewhere, in QDM QQ. 4–5 he clearly considers a 
state of ungraced and complete natural flourishing to be a coherent possi-
bility. Other texts that apparently deny such a possibility, notably ST 1a2ae, 
Q.3, A.8, are intended, I think, to deny a stable natural end for those who 
grow to maturity in the present world. Given also the recent and detailed 
22Unlike contemporary philosophical discourse, in which God and matters pertaining to 
God are quite often classified as “supernatural,” Aquinas regards at least some knowledge of 
God as natural to human beings and accessible to philosophical investigation, as illustrated 
by his famous five proofs for the existence of God (ST 1a, Q. 2, A. 3). 
23Aquinas argues for a common age of about thirty at the general resurrection in In Sent., 
lib. 4, d. 44, Q. 1, A. 3, drawing inspiration principally from Ephesians 4:13. 
24Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto IV, vv.24–35. See also the extreme left-hand corner of 
Enguerrand Quarton, The Coronation of the Virgin (1452–53), in which the ungraced innocents 
are kneeling in a place of their own, without the flames of hell or of purgatory. Here they look 
up at heaven, but their vision is blocked by an impenetrable slab of rock, implying a state 
that is free of punishment but in which there is also permanent unrequited desire. Quarton’s 
painting represents a more positive vision of the fate of the ungraced innocents than that of 
many patristic writers, but is still less positive than the account of Aquinas, who holds that 
these innocents have no unrequited desire.
25I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for anticipating this objection.
26de Lubac, Le Mystère Du Surnaturel.
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rebuttals of de Lubac’s arguments, notably by Lawrence Feingold, there 
is no reason, therefore, not to proceed with a deeper examination of the 
natural flourishing described in QDM QQ. 4–5.27
3. The Children of Faerie
Aquinas offers a strikingly positive account of the fate of the ungraced 
innocents compared to the received sense of some important patristic 
writings, but his account still raises the question of why there should be 
any difference between their fate and that of the saints. Assuming that 
God wants everyone to enjoy the beatitific vision who is capable of doing 
so, and assuming also that grace is not a mere token of admission to the 
presence of God, like a “Get Out of Jail Free” card in a game, then grace 
must presumably do something to enable this vision. What then does 
grace do, and what does the absence of grace mean for the ungraced in-
nocents in terms of their relationship to God and to others?
One approach to these questions is to begin by considering the root cause 
of separation from God. Eleonore Stump has written extensively about this 
problem in Wandering in Darkness and I assume her approach here as the 
starting point of my argument. The principle of Stump’s approach is as 
follows; namely, that Aquinas’s account of the nature of love requires two 
interconnected desires: (1) the desire for the good of the beloved; and (2) 
the desire for union with the beloved.28
Many details are needed to clarify the meaning of these desires. What 
is most relevant here to the issue of separation from God, however, is that 
a desire for the good of the beloved and for union with the beloved cannot 
be fulfilled simply by the unilateral will of the one who loves:
Paula does not have sole control over whether or not she is close to Jerome. If 
Jerome is not integrated within himself, then Paula’s ability to be close to him 
is limited or inefficacious, no matter what she chooses to do. This point holds 
even if it is God’s closeness to Jerome, rather than Paula’s, that is at issue.29
The problem Stump highlights in this text is that union among friends 
requires significant personal presence and and mutual closeness, but 
genuine mutual closeness to a person requires that person to be integrated 
around goodness. If a first person desires not to have the desires he has, 
so that he is internally divided, the second person will always be distant 
from some part of the first person, and the first person will also, in an 
analogous or extended sense, fail to be close to himself.30
27The possibility of a wholly coherent “pure nature” without the gift of sanctifying grace 
was one of the most controversial topics of Catholic theology in the twentieth century. For 
a recent and detailed study of the issues and how they relate to the work of Aquinas, see 
Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God.
28Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 91.
29Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 127.
30As Stump explains, there are other dimensions to the problem. Besides an internal divi-
sion of desires, a first person who has done wrong has a past, which engenders a desire to 
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On Stump’s account, moral wrongdoing is sufficient for this self- 
alienation, since a person cannot be integrated around anything other 
than goodness. Hence a first person who has does wrong or has the dis-
position to do wrong is not someone with whom a second person can be 
fully united. For regeneration to begin, what is needed is that the person 
who is in this divided state, and who does not yet have a good will, at least 
has a “global higher-order desire for a will that wills the good.”31 But how 
is this state attained, given that a good will cannot be willed by a will that 
is not already good? Stump’s ingenious response is that the will can be in a 
quiescent state, like a child ceasing to resist a painful medical injection. In 
this quiescent state, God infuses what is required for regeneration.
Without disputing any of the essentials of this account, which is far more 
detailed and subtle in its original form, I suggest that there is an implicit 
distinction in this process of regeneration that needs to be made explicit in 
order to understand the state of ungraced innocence. Stump refers to the 
infusion of grace following on from quiescence of the will, but does not 
emphasise the separation of these two events that may occur in practice. As 
an example, Stump mentions the famous account of Augustine weeping 
in a garden as the beginning of a process that brought an end to the divi-
sions in his will, an event that took place sometime in 386.32 Augustine’s 
baptism, however, took place on 24 April 387, and according to Augustine’s 
theology, it was baptism that really mattered for his salvation. As this case 
shows, the infusion of grace in the salvific sense follows quiescence, but 
these two events are often separated in time, underlying the possibility of 
a period during which there is nothing to drive a person away from God, 
and yet the person is not united with God. If this quiescent state is possible 
for adults who have a history of moral wrongdoing, it seems even more 
possible for children who have never had any internal fragmentation of 
desire, or the associated shame and guilt.
Given that a quiescent state is possible, what is it like? The character-
istics can be clarified by considering again what is needed for closeness 
to other persons. Stump presents the case of a human person, Paula, who 
is alienated from Jerome due to Jerome’s disintegrated will. Once the 
impediment due to this disintegrated will is removed, then closeness be-
tween Jerome and Paula becomes possible simply because human beings 
have natural faculties for interpersonal communication. The existence of 
such faculties is self-evident. Most human beings are born with strong 
dispositions for interpersonal communication, as can be seen in the way 
in which babies identify faces within a very short time of being born and 
avoid or retreat from the presence of the second person, due to shame and to guilt. Such 
a state is not irreparable, and the story of this reparation is at the heart of the Christian 
Gospel, but the brief summary given in this paper suffices to show some of the complex 
consequences of moral wrongdoing as regards alienation from other persons.
31Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 165.
32Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 167.
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engage in reciprocal smiling.33 As children grow up, they manifest a wide 
range of behaviours such a pointing and turn-taking that express shared 
awareness of shared focus with other persons. Such awareness, generally 
classified as “joint attention,” engenders a sense of union in which a first 
person “I” naturally addresses a second person as “you.”34 For this reason 
and others, joint attention may also be described as second-person relat-
edness.35 Provided there is no impediment, such as a distintegrated will, 
second-person relatedness may develop finally into friendship.
In the text cited above, Stump transposes this pattern of human closeness 
to that of closeness to omnipotent God, but there is an important distinc-
tion between these cases. As noted above, human persons have strong 
dispositions to relate to other human persons as “I” to “you,” and there is 
accumulating evidence for specific neural conditions and concomitants of 
such relatedness. Examples include neuronal activity that correlates with 
face cognition,36 neural processes that correlate with hearing the sound of 
human voices,37 and neural regions that influence sensitivity to prosody as 
a way of sharing a psychological stance.38 The implication is that embodied 
human persons are, one might say, “hard-wired” for second-person relat-
edness with other embodied human persons and usually manifest this 
fact from a very early age.
By contrast, how is it possible to be close to God? Without special divine 
action, we do not see God with our eyes, hear God with our ears, or touch 
God with our hands. As Aristotle argued, God is unlike us, and friendship 
between God and human beings is impossible for unaided human nature.39 
33Meltzoff and Moore, “Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neonates,” 
75–78.
34Eilan et al., eds., Joint Attention. The notion of joint attention as “sharing an awareness 
of the sharing of the focus” comes in particular from Peter Hobson’s chapter in this volume, 
“What puts Jointness into Joint Attention?,” 185, something, he adds, “that often entails 
sharing an attitude towards the thing or event in question.” Note that to address someone 
as “you” does not, in itself, imply second-person relatedness in all particular instances, but 
rather that second-person relatedness is the usual context in which these grammatical forms 
naturally arise. Even God and Satan are depicted as being in dialogue in Job 1:7–2:6, using 
second-person grammatical forms, without implying that they share the kind of common 
stance associated with joint attention. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for 
anticipating this objection.
35The uniqueness, importance and irreducibility of the “I”-“you” relation are principles 
associated with the pioneering work of Buber, Ich und Du. In this paper, I use the term “re-
latedness” rather than “relationship” because joint attention may be something momentary, 
although also a plausible condition of relationships such as friendship. I am grateful to Peter 
Hobson for making this point to me in discussions. 
36See, for example, Bodamer, “Die Prosop-Agnosie”; Yin, “Looking at Upside-down 
Faces”; Thompson, “Margaret Thatcher”; Perrett et al., “Visual Cells in the Temporal Cortex 
Sensitive to Face View and Gaze Direction”; Farah, Levinson, and Klein, “Face Perception 
and within-Category Discrimination in Prosopagnosia”; Rolls, “The Representation of Infor-
mation about Faces in the Temporal and Frontal Lobes”; Freiwald, Tsao, and Livingstone, “A 
Face Feature Space in the Macaque Temporal Lobe.”
37Belin, “Hearing Voices.”
38Heilman, Leon, and Rosenbek, “Affective Aprosodia from a Medial Frontal Stroke.”
39Nicomachean Ethics 8.7.1159a3-9.
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As noted previously, Aquinas concurs with this assessment, namely that 
human beings cannot by nature alone be close to God. For friendship to be 
possible, God needs to infuse certain divine gifts associated with the grace 
of baptism. Only with these gifts, which can be interpreted as enabling 
joint attention with God, is second-person relatedness to God possible, 
culminating in friendship.40 This claim is consistent with a striking change 
in grammar in the transition from classical to early Christian texts. For 
example, Aristotle only uses third-person grammatical forms to describe 
God, but Augustine also addresses God using second-person forms, as in 
his famous exclamation, “Late have I loved you!”41
What then is a state of innocent quiescence like that is not alienated 
from God through wrongdoing but lacks second-person relatedness to 
God because of an absence of the requisite gifts? Drawing from a popular 
film produced by Steven Spielberg, the idea was suggested to me at one 
time that these ungraced innocents might be thought of as “sinless grem-
lins,” namely as vicious creatures that just happen to be liquidated before 
they have the opportunity to do any harm.42 Beyond this life, if you had 
the opportunity to decide their fate, you would not wish to punish such 
creatures since they have done no wrong. On the other hand, you would 
not want to keep with them with you and your children in your home. 
Instead, you would try to make them as comfortable as possible outside.
Aquinas, however, would dispute the notion that this state of unbap-
tised innocence is actually vicious as opposed to being disposed to become 
vicious. A person in this state might be better described as having a ten-
dency to fall into wrongdoing due to the absence of grace, like a barrel of 
wine without its hoops, or a spurred horse without its bridle.43 Moreover, 
on the basis of Stump’s analysis, there is nothing about this state that in-
volves an actual rejection of God, but simply an inability to respond to 
God in certain ways. Hence there is no obvious reason, it seems, for these 
persons to be separated from the saints. What then does the absence of 
grace mean for the ungraced innocents in terms of their relationship to 
God and to others?
On this basis of the preceding analysis, the crucial point of distinction is 
that the ungraced innocents do not have second-person relatedness to God, 
as “I” to “you.” But what is it like to lack the capacity for joint attention 
or second-person relatedness? The issue in question here is the mode of 
relating to other persons, but the only persons with whom human beings 
typically interact are other human persons. Hence if there is an appropriate 
metaphor for what it means to lack second-person relatedness to God, 
40For an interpretation of Aquinas’s account of infused virtues and gifts in terms of joint 
attention, see Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics.
41Augustine, Confessions 10.27.38, “Sero te amavi.”
42Dante, Gremlins.
43QDM Q. 4, A. 2, ad 7. Note that on the basis of this approach, Aquinas diverges from 
the way that original sin is often imagined, namely in terms of a damaged or even changed 
human nature. See, for example, King, “Damaged Goods.”
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the only possibility for finding such a metaphor is to examine potential 
parallels in human social interactions. This task is inherently challenging, 
however, for the reason noted previously: human beings typically have 
strong, innate dispositions for second-person relatedness, and human 
social interactions are typically saturated with many diverse kinds of 
joint attention.
A surprise in recent years, however, has been to discover that joint at-
tention between human persons is sometimes inhibited or atypical even 
when the persons are together and otherwise capable of interaction. As I 
have argued in detail elsewhere, atypical or inhibited second-person re-
latedness is a condition closely associated with autistic spectrum disorder 
(ASD), a condition that is also linked with difficulties in developing lan-
guage, notably difficulties with grasping the proper use of second-person 
modes of grammar.44 Those with ASD have no difficulty in identifying 
the presence of a person as a distinct category of being in the world, and 
hence are perfectly capable of third-person descriptions. By contrast, to a 
greater or lesser degree, they are not moved readily to align with others in 
the sense of participating in their psychological stance towards objects of 
attention. This lack of alignment is manifested physically in a comparative 
absence of joint attention activities such as pointing.45 Those with ASD, 
some of whom prefer to be called autistics, are sometimes described as 
living in the midst of persons but not “seeing” persons, even though this 
claim is incorrect if interpreted literally.46
By the parallel with autism in human relations, I propose therefore that 
the state of pure nature, in which someone has no present or past moral 
wrongdoing but lacks the dispositions for second-person relatedness to 
God, could be described by the metaphor of spiritual autism in relation to 
God.47 The state of limbo, a state of ungraced perfection that lacks nothing 
from the perspective of someone in that state, would therefore appear 
spiritually autistic from the perspective of the life of grace.
This claim requires some very careful clarifications. First, the “autism” 
of spiritual autism is metaphoric, not literal, just as physical blindness has 
been used for millennia as a metaphor for a lack of spiritual understanding 
but without implying that the physically blind are thereby spiritually de-
ficient. In the context of Aquinas’s theological anthropology, the metaphor 
merely provides a way to grasp a sense of what is absent in the state of 
limbo from a divine perspective. A child with original sin may know that 
his divine parent is present in an objective or third-person sense, while 
lacking the capacity to relate to the parent in a second-person sense. 
This interpretation, incidentally, resonates with the scriptural account of 
44Pinsent, The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, 47–49. See also Tager-Flusberg, 
“Dissociations in Form and Function in the Acquisition of Language by Autistic Children.”
45Hobson, “What Puts Jointness into Joint Attention?”
46Park, The Siege, 56.
47Pinsent, The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, 100–102.
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Genesis 3:9,48 recounting the first question that the Lord God asks Adam 
after the fall, namely, “Where are you?” God cannot, presumably, lose 
people in the third-person sense of knowing where they are in time and 
space, but can lose second-person relatedness to persons who have delib-
erately relinquished the disposition to respond to divine love.
Second, spiritual autism in this context is a metaphor drawn from an ex-
trapolation of ASD taken to an extreme condition, which is probably never 
found in practice, and in which second-person relatedness is severed. 
By contrast, a complete absence of second-person relatedness to human 
persons is rarely, if ever, true of physical ASD. In practice, ASD covers a 
very broad spectrum, and some form of joint attention is almost always 
possible between human persons.
Third, the use of the phrase “spiritual autism” should not be taken as 
implying anything exceptional, since spiritual autism is not the condition 
of a minority but is as universal as the original sin to which it is attrib-
uted. Nor should this term be taken as implying that those with physical 
ASD are in an unusually disadvantaged spiritual state. Understanding 
the spiritual experience of the autistic remains a daunting challenge, 
but autism in itself is a state of innocence, and one that is not without 
at least some spiritual advantages. In particular, since it has been argued 
that sin can function as a pseudo-second-personal agent, parasitical 
upon a person’s capacity for second-person relatedness, those with ASD 
may also, in effect, be partially or wholly shielded from many kinds of 
moral wrongdoing.49
What then would it be like to be in a condition of spiritual autism to 
God at the resurrection, but otherwise to be in a state of complete natural 
perfection? First, this state is not one of regret. In the present world of 
time, God clearly desires to share grace with those who do not have it, 
and to advance in merit those who do have it. At the resurrection of the 
dead, however, friendship with God and the beatific vision is something 
that the saints share in unequally, according to their merits. Yet the general 
sense of Christian tradition is also that no one who receives this vision 
is dissatisfied or left with a sense of incompleteness (a common, albeit 
somewhat misleading, picture of these differences being in terms of the 
capacities of different-sized containers, all of which are full).50 As noted 
previously, Aquinas explicitly extends the same claim to the state of the 
unbaptised innocents, namely that they have no unsatisfied desire to see 
48Cf. Job 38:4
49Eastman, “The Shadow Side of Second-Person Engagement.” 
50Although a full bucket contains a far greater volume than a full thimble, the bucket is 
not more or less full than the thimble, since the fullness in each case is relative to the proper 
capacity of each container. Similarly, no saint has an incomplete happiness, in subjective 
terms, but some saints have a greater capacity for happiness than others, and hence their 
states are unequal, in objective terms, cf. ST 1a, Q. 12, A. 6. Note that the diversity of the 
states of heaven, based on the diversity of the merits of the saints, gained formal doctrinal 
recognition at the Council of Florence (Laetentur Coeli) in 1439.
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God. Whether in a state of limbo or in heaven, it is impossible to regret 
one’s fate, since one’s capacity for happiness is completely satisfied.
Second, there are many aspects of the resurrected state of glory in the 
Christian tradition that do not require direct second-person relatedness to 
God. According to Aquinas, as noted previously, those in this condition 
enjoy all the good things that they desire naturally, do not suffer, do not 
die, and are resurrected at the perfect age. Beyond these benefits, broadly 
consistent with the Elysian Fields of the classical imagination, there is no 
obvious reason why God would deny any of the goods of the economy 
of salvation that are within the capacity of all innocents. Christian tradi-
tion implies that, after the general resurrection, such goods include the 
knowledge and company of Jesus Christ in his human nature, the Mother 
of God, and all others who are resurrected but not damned.
Third, the lack of an ability to know God as “you” to “I” does not ex-
clude a rich diversity of other knowledge of God by signs, metaphors, 
propositions, and indirect communication. In particular, an inability to see 
God does not prevent an ungraced innocent from seeing those who see the 
face of God, assuming the perfection of natural faculties and a physical 
resurrection. As noted previously, Dante offers a slightly different account 
of limbo from that of Aquinas. Nevertheless, this line of reasoning has 
poetic parallels in the interaction of Virgil and Beatrice in the Divine Comedy,
Among those was I who are in suspense,
And a fair, saintly Lady called to me
In such wise, I besought her to command me.
Her eyes where shining brighter than the Star.51
In these verses, Virgil, who lacks grace, sees the face of one who sees God 
and also perceives some effects of this vision, just as the saints mediate 
signs of the fruitfulness of grace in the present world. Hence it seems pos-
sible, or at least not impossible, that the saints can mediate some effects 
of the beatific vision in the post-resurrection life. An appealing corollary 
is that those who can still make choices about grace have something posi-
tive to offer those in limbo, provided they reach heaven themselves. The 
greater the number and kinds of saints, the greater the glory of reflected 
beatitude that these innocents can receive, like adding flowers to a garden 
or colours to a spectrum.
What these observations add up to is a state that is clearly different from 
that of the saints, but not a matter of regret or isolation. What, then, would 
this state be like from the perspective of those who share in this condi-
tion? Whatever the limitations of ASD as a metaphor, some autistics have 
made essentially the same point about ASD that Aquinas makes about the 
completeness of the state of natural flourishing in limbo, in which there is 
no unfulfilled desire. Autistic advocate Jim Sinclair has written,
51Longfellow, The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri; Inferno, Canto II, 52–55.
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Autism isn’t something a person has, or a “shell” that a person is trapped in-
side. There’s no normal child hidden behind the autism. Autism is a way of 
being. It is pervasive; it colors every experience, every sensation, perception, 
thought, emotion, and encounter, every aspect of existence. It is not possible 
to separate the autism from the person—and if it were possible, the person 
you’d have left would not be the same person.52
Although Sinclair raises issues here that remain contested, his account 
underlines how he does not see himself as trapped. This perspective 
may offer a corrective to traditional images of limbo being a prison of 
dreariness, shadows, unrequited desires or noble regret. Moreover, just as 
autistics have a way of being that is open to many experiences that others 
overlook, ungraced innocents may make their own unique contributions 
to post-resurrection glory.
What, then, would this state be like from the perspective of those who 
do have grace? On this account, the saints cannot enjoy with them shared 
awareness of shared focus on God, in union with God, although that does 
not preclude shared awareness of shared focus on created things in glory. 
The situation is one in which second-person relatedness between the un-
graced innocents and the saints is possible but limited.
As an imperfect metaphor of what limited second-person relatedness 
might be like, consider the following observations from The Siege, the 
auto biography of a mother bringing up an autistic child. Clara Claiborne 
Park describes her child as one who “looked through human beings as if 
they were glass,” a phrase that may parallel the inability of those in limbo 
to “see” God, not simply as a cause, but as “you” to “I.”53 As she grows 
up, her child has difficulty understanding the subtle language of faces and 
bodies, and therefore has an “inability to interpret the social world.”54
A possible application of these observations is that the ungraced in-
nocents lack insight into what one might call the social world of heavenly 
glory. As noted previously, however, even the saints see God in diverse 
degrees and ways, expressed in Dante’s Paradiso by the image of the dif-
ferent circles of heaven. Hence rather than the ungraced innocents being 
uniquely limited, they may, together with the saints, form part of a much 
more variegated society than is commonly supposed. Moreover, even a 
life that lacks the direct vision of God should not be thought of merely 
in terms of limits, especially as these innocents have never known sin. In 
The Siege, Park describes her child Elly as having a “fairy lightness in her 
movements . . . a fairy purity in her detached gaze,” and mentions the 
strange integrity of a life that is remote but serene, detached, in perfect 
equilibrium and untouched by malice.55
52Sinclair, “Don’t Mourn for Us.” I am grateful to Michael Waddell for bringing this article 
to my attention.
53Park, The Siege, 5.
54Park, The Siege, 292.
55Park, The Siege, 5.
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These observations may provide the best way to sum up Aquinas’s 
teaching on limbo in a few words, reinterpreted in this paper in the light 
of new work in philosophy and psychology. Park’s repeated use of the 
word “fairy” suggests a way to rescue the reputation of limbo from its 
connotations of bleakness and isolation, especially when the misused 
term “fairy” is replaced by the medieval term “faerie” to recover its rich 
mythological connotations. The word “faerie” conveys the notion of a state 
of innocence and of preternatural gifts, to which are added various bless-
ings of salvation that are distinct from those of the saints but exceed mere 
Aristotelian natural flourishing. Moreover, this state does not need to be 
one of loneliness, even if it lacks the capacity for the direct vision of God. 
There is no obvious reason why the children of God should not love and 
be with the children of faerie, just as, at the very end of her story, Park adds 
that her child’s brothers and sisters genuinely love her.56
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